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923 
THE SUPREME COURT’S HEIGHTENED RETALIATION 
STANDARD IN NASSAR: A PRUDENT LIMITATION OR A 
MISGUIDED RESTRICTION TO TITLE VII CLAIMS? 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar1 
(decided June 24, 2013) 
 
While suspect class status-based discrimination claims and 
activity-based retaliation claims were once governed by “motivating 
factor” causation, in a landmark decision, the United States Supreme 
Court recently ruled that “but-for” causation must be used to establish 
claims of activity-based employment discrimination.2  However, the 
Court declined to raise the standard for suspect status-based discrimi-
nation claims and left American jurists with several unanswered 
questions.  Will valid Title VII claims based wholly on circumstantial 
evidence still have the resilience to survive the prima facie stage?  
What are the implications for related state claims?  Are all employ-
ment discrimination claims destined to require this higher standard of 
proof?  United States district courts now face the challenge of inter-
preting the legal consequences of the Supreme Court ruling and ap-
plying a higher standard of review. 
I. CONTEXT OF THE COURT DECISION 
An extensive review of the Court’s holding indicates that ju-
dicial resource concerns influenced the decision to make it harder for 
Title VII claims to survive summary judgment.  Exploration of the 
history and context surrounding this most recent Supreme Court deci-
sion may shed light on the thrust and momentum of labor law and 
civil rights issues in America today.  A full appreciation of the impli-
cations of this heightened causation standard requires an examination 
of the controversy that gave rise to the momentous change. 
 
1 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
2 Id. at 2520 (2013). 
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Naiel Nassar is a “medical doctor of Middle Eastern descent 
who specializes” in infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS 
treatment.3  In 1995, he was hired by the University of Texas South-
western Medical Center (“UTSMC”) to serve dual positions as both a 
University faculty member and Associate Medical Director of the 
Amelia Court HIV/AIDS Clinic at Parkland Hospital, a clinical 
healthcare facility affiliated with the University.4  After taking a sab-
batical for additional medical training from 1998 to 2001, Dr. Nassar 
resumed his position at the hospital and returned to the University as 
an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases.5  
His employment continued without incident until 2004.6 
For Dr. Nassar, everything changed in June 2004, when 
UTSMC hired Dr. Beth Levine as the Chief of Infectious Disease 
Medicine, a position which made her Nassar’s ultimate supervisor.7  
From the start, Nassar claims that Levine treated him differently than 
she treated his colleagues, interrogating him for one-and-one-half 
hours with a long line of questions, while speaking with other staff 
members for only fifteen or twenty minutes, during her initial inter-
views with the faculty.8  Nassar claims that Levine disproportionately 
criticized his productivity and effectiveness and unjustifiably scruti-
nized his billing practices.9  Nassar also claims that, toward the end 
of 2005, when UTSMC considered hiring a physician of Middle 
Eastern descent, Levine remarked that “Middle Easterners are lazy” 
and that she successfully opposed the hiring of that physician by the 
University.10  Upon learning that Parkland Hospital hired the physi-
cian independently of UTSMC, Levine reportedly commented that 
the hospital had “hired another one,” which was taken to mean “an-
other person . . . who is Muslim and who is dark-skinned.”11 
UTSMC painted a decidedly different picture of the facts, 
stating that Levine was rarely even on site because she focused on re-
 
3 Id. at 2523. 
4 Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Petitioner]. 
5 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2523. 
6 Brief for Respondent at 4, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Respondent]. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Respondent, supra note 6, at 5-6. 
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search, not patient care.12  When she was at the HIV/AIDS Clinic, 
UTSMC claimed that Levine not only gave Nassar the highest evalu-
ation ratings and praise, but even suggested that Nassar seek a pro-
motion and submitted a recommendation letter on his behalf.13  How-
ever, Nassar was dissatisfied with Levine’s recommendation and 
believed Levine was actually attempting to delay his promotion.14  
Thus, beginning in 2005, Nassar began exploring the possibility of 
working for Parkland Hospital directly, rather than continuing via his 
UTSMC faculty position under Levine.15  This move proved to be 
problematic for everyone involved. 
Nassar’s proposal to leave UTSMC and to work solely for 
Parkland Hospital was initially met with opposition.16  Pursuant to an 
affiliation agreement between the school and the hospital, as well as 
to Parkland Hospital’s rules and bylaws, physicians at the hospital 
were required to be faculty members of UTSMC to satisfy the criteria 
for the institution’s designation as a teaching hospital.17  Still, negoti-
ations continued with at least one member of the hospital, who told 
Nassar that if he were to resign from the medical school, there would 
be “no reason for [the hospital] not to employ” him.18 
Spurred on by a verbal employment offer, salary negotiations 
and e-mail exchanges detailing the steps necessary to finalize his di-
rect employment with Parkland Hospital, Nassar submitted his formal 
resignation from UTSMC in July 2006.19  In actuality, Parkland Hos-
pital had yet to officially offer Nassar a position by this time, and alt-
hough an offer had been drafted with a tentative starting date of July 
10, 2006, this offer letter was unsigned and unsent when Nassar re-
signed from the school on July 3.20 
In his resignation letter, Nassar wrote that continued harass-
ment and discrimination by Levine were the main reasons for his de-
parture and alleged that Levine’s attitude “stems from religious, ra-
cial and cultural bias against Arabs and Muslims that have resulted in 
 
12 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 6. 
13 Id. at 6-7. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Respondent, supra note 6, at 6. 
16 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
17 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 8. 
18 Id. at 8-9; Respondent, supra note 6, at 6. 
19 Respondent, supra note 6, at 6. 
20 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 9. 
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a hostile work environment.”21  The letter sent shock waves through 
the hospital, prompting numerous discussions about how to address 
the issue.22  While some hospital staff members wanted Nassar to “sit 
tight,” others, including Dr. Gregory Fitz, Nassar’s direct supervisor, 
expressed consternation over the allegations.23  Fitz told another em-
ployee that Levine had been “publicly humiliated” by the letter and 
that it was “very important that she be publicly exonerated.”24 At tri-
al, this employee testified that Fitz admitted to blocking Nassar’s 
employment at the hospital in retaliation for sending the resignation 
letter.25  Negotiations permanently ceased less than a month later, 
when Nassar accepted a job in California near the end of July 2006.26 
II. LITIGATION AND THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS 
Pursuing his claim against the school, and in an effort to ex-
haust all administrative remedies, Nassar filed charges with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which found 
“credible, testimonial evidence” of discriminatory animus and retalia-
tion.27  Nassar then brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas, alleging two distinct violations of Ti-
tle VII—constructive discharge and retaliation.28  Nassar’s claim for 
constructive discharge, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,29 was based on the allegation that Levine’s racially and reli-
giously motivated harassment effectively forced him to resign.30  His 
second claim, under section 2000e-3(a), was based upon Fitz’s hav-
ing prevented Parkland Hospital from hiring Nassar, in retaliation for 
complaining about Levine’s harassment.31 
The trial was bifurcated and, after a charge conference for the 
liability phase, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the ap-
 
21 Respondent, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Id. 
24 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
25 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10. 
26 Id. 
27 Respondent, supra note 6, at 8. 
28 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013). 
30 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524. 
31 Id. 
4
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propriate jury instructions for Nassar’s retaliation claim.32  UTSMC 
initially submitted its proposed jury instructions with a retaliation 
charge that would have allowed for a finding of liability if there was 
a mixed-motive for the adverse action against Nassar.33  Thus, it is 
not surprising that, when the charge conference took place on May 
21, 2010, UTSMC did not object to the mixed-motive retaliation in-
struction that was ultimately agreed upon.34  However, on May 24, 
the day the jury was to be charged, counsel for UTSMC asked the 
district court for permission to raise a new objection to the causation 
standard of the retaliation charge.35  Instead of the mixed-motive re-
taliation charge, UTSMC asked for instructions which would hold it 
liable for retaliation only if Fitz’s action was the “but-for” cause of 
Nassar’s barred employment, i.e., that Fitz would have approved 
Nassar’s direct employment with Parkland Hospital absent the retal-
iatory animus created by Nassar’s complaint of discrimination.36  The 
trial court rejected this request in light of precedent, decided little 
more than a month earlier, which held that a heightened causation 
standard was inappropriate for Title VII claims.37  Regardless, the 
court stated that the objection had “probably” been waived, since the 
deadline for objections had passed.38  Ultimately, the district court’s 
instructions were that, to establish liability, Nassar had to prove that 
retaliation was a motivating factor for UTSMC’s conduct, although 
other factors might have been a consideration.39 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Nassar on both the con-
structive discharge and retaliation claims.40  At the subsequent dam-
ages phase, the trial court instructed the jury on UTSMC’s affirma-
tive defense, namely that the school would not be liable for damages 
or back pay if it showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it 
would have taken the same action absent a retaliatory motive.41  The 
jury found that UTSMC did not carry its burden of showing that it 
 
32 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11; Respondent, supra note 6, at 8. 
33 Respondent, supra note 6, at 8. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 8-9. 
36 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11. 
37 Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 333 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating then-current precedent 
for issuing mixed-motive jury instructions). 
38 Respondent, supra note 6, at 9. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11. 
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would have taken the same action without considering the protected 
activity.42 It awarded Nassar $436,168 in back pay and $3,187,500 in 
damages, which the district court reduced to $300,000, in accordance 
with Title VII’s cap on compensatory damages.43  The court also 
awarded $489,927.50 in attorney’s fees.44 
UTSMC moved for a directed verdict on the basis of its af-
firmative defense, but the trial court denied the motion, noting the ex-
istence of “a great deal of evidence on both sides.”45  On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit vacated the constructive discharge verdict, concluding 
that Nassar failed to prove an aggravating factor necessary to estab-
lish the claim.46  As for the retaliation claim, the court of appeals up-
held the verdict, explaining that the jury “heard conflicting evidence 
about the timing and motivation of Fitz’s opposition” and resolved 
the conflict against UTSMC.47  This affirmation was based on the 
theory that retaliation claims under Section 2000e-3(a) were gov-
erned by the same standard that applied to status-based discrimina-
tion claims under Section 2000e-2(a)—motivating factor causation.48  
Having disallowed some of Nassar’s damages, the Fifth Circuit then 
remanded the case back to the district court for a new trial on the cor-
rect measure of damages for the retaliation verdict.49 
UTSMC then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en 
banc on the issue of the mixed-motive retaliation instruction, but the 
court denied rehearing by a vote of 9-6.50  Judge Smith, joined by 
three dissenting judges, supported UTSMC’s position in his dissent, 
asserting that Smith v. Xerox Corp.,51 with its lowered standard of 
causation, was “an erroneous interpretation of the statute and control-
ling caselaw” that should be overruled.52  At the same time, Judge El-
rod concurred for an entirely different reason, based on the Universi-
 
42 Id. 
43 Respondent, supra note 6, at 10. 
44 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 11. 
45 Respondent, supra note 6, at 10. 
46 Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 688 F.3d 211, 211 (5th Cir. 2012); Petitioner, 
supra note 4, at 12. 
47 Respondent, supra note 6, at 10. 
48 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing Smith, 602 F.3d at 330). 
49 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 12. 
50 Nassar, 688 F.3d at 211. 
51 602 F.3d at 330. 
52 Nassar, 688 F.3d at 213 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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ty’s waiver.53  By not objecting in a timely manner to the motivating 
factor jury instruction during the charge conference, Judge Elrod 
concluded that UTSMC waived its chance to make the argument on 
appeal, a fact which was compounded by UTSMC’s own concession 
that Smith was controlling and would have foreclosed its objection to 
the mixed-motive charge on the merits.54  And yet, Judge Smith came 
to the opposite conclusion, that the objection was preserved, citing 
the Federal Rules55 and UTSMC’s use of but-for causation as an af-
firmative defense.56  The Fifth Circuit’s denial was followed by a pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.57 
In its petition to the United States Supreme Court, UTSMC 
argued that the “case should begin and end with” the plain language 
of the statutory text.58  Under the Court’s reading of Title VII, a 
plaintiff should have to prove that retaliation was “the reason” for an 
adverse employment action, i.e., was its “but-for” cause.59  According 
to UTSMC, Congress’s selective tailoring of protected classes in the 
1991 Civil Rights Act amendments to Title VII was intentionally 
written to exclude the remaining provisions, namely retaliation.60  
Basically, it argued that the 1991 amendments should be seen as a 
case of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.61 
UTSMC consistently rested its arguments on a foundation laid 
by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.62 and argued that the mate-
rially identical language of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 196763 (“ADEA”) requires plaintiffs to prove but-for causa-
tion, so the same text in Title VII should also utilize this standard.64  
Further, UTSMC contended that a failure to extend the Gross stand-
ard to retaliation claims would be “a jurisprudential step backward,” 
and stressed the public policy reasons for abandoning a mixed-motive 
 
53 Id. at 211 (Elrod, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 211-12. 
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)-(c). 
56 Nassar, 688 F.3d, at 214 n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
57 Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 979, 979 (2013). 
58 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 14. 
59 Id. at 13; see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
60 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13. 
61 The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. 
62 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
63 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (making it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's age.”) (emphasis added). 
64 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 13. 
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burden shifting analysis.65  By proclaiming the simplicity of Gross, 
UTSMC sought to supplant the framework of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins,66 which complicated matters by allowing the employee to 
prevail when a discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in an 
employment decision, but nevertheless relieving the employer of lia-
bility if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employment decision would have been made absent the unlawful rea-
son.67 
UTSMC attacked Price Waterhouse, which was adopted in 
part and vacated in part by Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, cit-
ing Justice Kennedy’s dissent, which predicted that the framework 
would “result in confusion” and “more disarray in an area of the law 
already difficult for the bench and bar.”68  Under Price Waterhouse, 
as refined by the 1991 Act, “a plaintiff [may] obtain declaratory re-
lief, attorney’s fees, and costs . . . based solely on proof that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national[ origin] was a motivating factor in” an 
adverse employment action, subject to what is essentially a but-for 
affirmative defense that relieves the employer of liability for damages 
if it can prove it would have made the decision without the improper 
motivation.69  UTSMC argued that this framework was complex, im-
practical, and susceptible to abuse, as mixed-motives are easy to al-
lege and subjective intent is difficult to disprove.70 
Instead, UTSMC advocated the adoption of the causation 
standard in Gross, to be governed by the burden shifting test articu-
lated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.71  Under this frame-
work, the plaintiff-employee bears the initial burden and must estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the 
evidence.72  “The burden then [] shift[s] to the employer to articulate 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejec-
tion.”73  Once the employer has stated a valid reason, the burden 
shifts again, and the employee must then “demonstrate by competent 
 
65 Id. 
66 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). 
67 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 28. 
68 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Petitioner, supra note 4, 
at 25. 
69 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
70 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 30-31. 
71 Id. at 28 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 
72 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
73 Id. 
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evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for rejection were in 
fact a coverup for a [ ] discriminatory reason.”74 
By adopting the but-for standard of Gross and using the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to establish proof, 
the Court, UTSMC urged, could avoid all the uncertainties that dog-
ged the Price Waterhouse test.75  According to UTSMC, Title VII re-
taliation, the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 should all be 
governed by a but-for causation standard.76  Finally, in light of its ar-
gument to adopt a but-for standard, UTSMC believed that it was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law, given the facts, under its suggest-
ed framework.77 
In his reply petition to the United States Supreme Court, 
Nassar echoed the sentiments of Judge Elrod, arguing that the Court 
should not decide the case on the merits because UTSMC forfeited its 
challenge to the mixed-motive retaliation charge.78  If the Court were 
to decide on the merits, Nassar presented two possible theories which 
would resolve the case in his favor, both of which addressed the 
amendments contained in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.79  Specifically, 
Nassar’s counsel addressed the addition of sections 703(m) and 
706(g)(2)(B) to Title VII, which collectively codified the mixed-
motive standard and limited-remedy affirmative defense.80 
Nassar argued that, because it is unlawful for race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin to be a motivating factor in employment 
decisions, retaliation for activities taken in defense of any of these 
protected statuses is equally unlawful.81  Essentially, “retaliation for 
opposing discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic is 
itself discrimination on that basis.”82  Nassar argued that this interpre-
 
74 Id. at 805. 
75 Petitioner, supra note 4, at 28. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 35. 
78 Respondent, supra note 6, at 11. 
79 Id. at 11-12. 
80 Id. at 12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (“[if] respondent demonstrates 
that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible 
motivating factor, the court . . . shall not award damages.”). 
81 Respondent, supra note 6, at 12. 
82 Id. 
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tation would not only create uniformity, but also be consistent with 
EEOC policy.83 
In the alternative, even if the Court were to adopt UTSMC’s 
interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments, Nassar ar-
gued that retaliation claims would still be governed by the lesser 
standard articulated in the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting analy-
sis.84  Under that framework, an employee need only show a mixed-
motivation for an adverse employment decision.85  Nassar also ar-
gued that the decision in Gross was specifically applied to ADEA age 
discrimination claims, not to Title VII (another case of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius), and supported the assertion by quoting 
the Gross opinion: “[courts] must be careful not to apply rules appli-
cable under one statute to a different statute without careful and criti-
cal examination.”86  Nassar further highlighted the distinction be-
tween the ADEA and Title VII by noting that the ADEA actually 
includes a provision that would immunize employers who discrimi-
nate based on age, so long as the decision was also based on “reason-
able factors other than age.”87  Finally, even if the Court were to find 
that the Gross standard applied, Nassar argued the case should be re-
manded for trial.88 Considering that the jury failed to accept 
UTSMC’s affirmative defense under the but-for causation standard at 
the damages phase, it is reasonable to believe that a jury instructed 
under the but-for Gross standard would similarly find for Nassar at 
the liability stage of a bifurcated trial.89 
Not to be outdone, UTSMC, in its reply brief, refined its posi-
tion and stressed that, under Gross, the 1991 amendments were dis-
positive evidence of Congressional intent to require a higher standard 
of causation for retaliation claims.90  UTSMC began by noting that 
both parties agreed that the Title VII retaliation provision contained 




85 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion). 
86 Gross, 557 U.S. at 174 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 
(2008)). 
87 Respondent, supra note 6, at 13; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f). 
88 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2517. 
89 Respondent, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
90 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 
(2013) (No. 12-484) [hereinafter Petitioner Reply]. 
91 Id. 
10
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cause Gross required the ADEA provision to be proven by a but-for 
standard of causation, it followed that the identical language of the 
Title VII retaliation provision should require an identical causation 
standard.92 
Stating that its rationale was clear-cut, UTSMC argued that 
the 1991 amendments only authorized mixed-motive treatment for 
discrimination claims made on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin—not for claims of retaliation, which Congress spe-
cifically addressed in a different provision of Title VII.93  Further, 
UTSMC charged Nassar’s counsel with attempting “to override Title 
VII’s plain text and structure by relying on a line of decisions holding 
that, when Congress has not specifically addressed retaliation, a 
broad ‘general’ prohibition on class-based discrimination can be con-
strued to encompass retaliation.”94  To UTSMC, Nassar’s argument 
was fallacious because the Court had already determined that “Title 
VII’s specificity makes it ‘vastly different’ from such general provi-
sions.”95 
Attacking Nassar’s reliance on Price Waterhouse, UTSMC 
posited that the 1991 amendments and subsequent interpretation in 
Gross had eliminated Price Waterhouse’s stare decisis effect, due to 
both the purposeful division of status-based and conduct-based provi-
sions contained in 42 U.S.C. section 2000e, et seq., and since the 
1991 Civil Rights Act subsequently abrogated Price Waterhouse in 
part.96  With those 1991 amendments, “Congress’s careful tailoring” 
was intended to imply that only Title VII class-based discrimination 
claims should be subject to a lower standard of causation.97  Accord-
ing to UTSMC, Nassar’s interpretation would force juries to apply up 
to three different standards to any given controversy, something 
UTSMC classified as “the worst of all worlds.”98 
Also in its reply brief, UTSMC stressed the policy considera-
tions for applying a more stringent standard of causation to retaliation 
claims.99  Citing the potential for abuse, UTSMC pointed out that re-
 
92 Id. 
93 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
94 Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 1. 
95 Id. at 1-2. 
96 Id. at 16. 
97 Id. at 17. 
98 Id. at 18. 
99 Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 20. 
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taliation claims have become the single-most litigated type of dis-
crimination claim.100  With the high costs of defending against even 
meritless claims, shifting the burden of proof onto employers would 
make the cost of doing business even higher.101  UTSMC also noted 
that retaliation claims usually do not result in summary judgment un-
der the mixed-motive standard, as the subjective nature of the claim 
forces “defendant[s] to try to prove a negative.”102 
Finally, in terms of public policy, UTSMC argued that apply-
ing a mixed-motive standard would render Title VII’s retaliation pro-
vision a “thought control bill.”103  Because it is inevitable that an em-
ployer will harbor some degree of hurt or resentment upon learning 
of an employee complaint, it would be improper to assume that a ma-
terial issue of fact exists when that umbrage played no meaningful 
part in a subsequent adverse employment decision.104  To do so 
would be tantamount to assuming employer malfeasance, and there is 
no basis for this presumption within the context of routine employ-
ment decisions.105 
As to the facts in the instant case, UTSMC argued that there 
was no dispute that the school would have taken the same action, as it 
had a clear policy requiring hospital physicians to be members of 
UTSMC faculty.106  It had twice denied Nassar’s request to circum-
vent the policy before the impetus for retaliation even occurred.107  
As a result, even if an improper retaliatory animus later became an 
additional motive, that retaliation was irrelevant to the employment 
decision.108  Thus, under what it called the “correct legal standard” of 
but-for causation, UTSMC asked the Court to grant judgment as a 
matter of law.109 
 
100 Id.; see Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the 
Retail Litigation Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-17, Univ. of Texas 
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484) (noting that 16,394 EEOC re-
taliation claims were filed in 1997, while 31,208 retaliation claims were filed with the EEOC 
in 2012.  Retaliation claims accounted for 38.1% of all discrimination charges filed in 2012.  
Retaliation has been the most frequently alleged type of claim since 2009.). 
101 Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 20. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 21. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Petitioner Reply, supra note 90, at 22. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 22-24. 
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III. SPLIT DECISION 
Nassar was argued before the Court on April 24, 2013, and 
decided on June 24, 2013.110  Speaking for the majority in the 5-4 de-
cision, Associate Justice Kennedy first delivered a preamble to estab-
lish the context of the decision.111  Before discussing the merits, he 
began by affirming the basic premise that a plaintiff’s right to com-
pensation was contingent upon the showing of a causal link between 
the injury sustained and the wrong alleged.112  The standard of causa-
tion required then depends upon the wrong alleged.113 
While noting that Title VII is the centerpiece of federal legis-
lation geared toward prohibiting wrongful discrimination, the majori-
ty remarked on the distinction between its status-based versus activi-
ty-based forms.114  Citing Price Waterhouse, the Court affirmed that a 
lesser standard was still appropriate for establishing status-based dis-
crimination under Title VII.115  That is, to establish a claim based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, an employee need only 
show that discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment 
decision.116  With this in mind, the Court then addressed whether that 
same standard of causation is applicable to claims of activity-based 
discrimination, namely retaliation under section 2000e-3(a).117 
In considering the appropriate standard, the Court looked to 
its holding in Gross, as it related to the issue of causation for estab-
lishing age-based discrimination under the ADEA.118  However, the 
standard in Gross was a higher barrier to plaintiffs, according to the 
Court’s interpretation of the ADEA, as an employee had to show that 
age discrimination was so closely related to an adverse employment 
action that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the un-
lawful motive in order to establish liability.119  The Court found that 
analysis and Gross’s standard of causation to be instructive in 
 
110 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2518. 
111 Id. at 2522. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 2525. 
114 Id. at 2522-23. 
115 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522-23. 
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Nassar.120 
After a brief recitation of the facts, the Court engaged in a 
more thorough analysis of the legislative and jurisprudential histories 
of causation as applied to tort law, noting that the usual standard of 
proof required a plaintiff to show that harm would not have occurred 
but for the defendant’s conduct.121  While recognizing that Price Wa-
terhouse lessened the causation standard for status-based discrimina-
tion claims and that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified its frame-
work in part, the Court nevertheless referred to Price Waterhouse and 
the 1991 amendments as creating “a problem of causation.”122  The 
majority found that the instruction provided by Gross, as it applied to 
the ADEA, was an adequate solution to this problem and should 
therefore provide the framework for Title VII retaliation claims, in-
cluding Nassar.123 
The balance of the majority opinion was almost entirely an 
endorsement of UTSMC’s position.  First, the Court found that, given 
the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the ADEA and 
Title VII retaliation provisions, it was proper to conclude, as in 
Gross, that Nassar’s retaliation claim should require proof that retali-
ation was the but-for cause of an employment decision.124  Second, 
although the Court acknowledged that retaliation fell within the defi-
nition of “unlawful employment practice[s],” the majority interpreted 
section 2000e-2(m) not to cover all employment practices, but rather 
only five of the seven discriminatory actions listed in the main provi-
sion—those related to status.125  Because the retaliation provision was 
placed in a separate subsection, the majority reasoned that Congress 
intended to distinguish between the two classes of discrimination be-
cause “[j]ust as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliber-
ate, so too are its structural choices.”126  The specificity of language 
in Title VII also weighed in favor of the majority’s adoption of the 
 
120 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523. 
121 Id. at 2525; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 431 cmt. a (1934) 
(discussing the distinction between cause in the philosophical sense and substantial cause for 
determining liability). 
122 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526. 
123 Id. at 2527. 
124 Id. at 2528. 
125 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.”). 
126 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2529. 
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but-for standard.127  By enumerating the specific practices Congress 
sought to prohibit under a motivating factor framework, it expressly 
excluded retaliation; therefore, “it [would] be incorrect to infer that 
Congress meant anything other than what the text does say on the 
subject of retaliation.”128 
Next, the Court discussed public policy reasons for adopting a 
heightened causation standard for retaliation claims.129  Noting the 
importance of a fair and responsible allocation of judicial resources 
and the increasing frequency of retaliation claims, the majority pre-
dicted that adopting a lowered standard of causation would contribute 
to the filing of frivolous claims.130  To illustrate this point, it posed a 
hypothetical in which an employee, who knows that an adverse em-
ployment action is pending, makes an unfounded accusation of dis-
crimination to forestall that adverse action.131  Once the adverse ac-
tion does occur, the hypothetical employee could claim retaliation 
and prevail under a mixed-motive standard of proof.132  Even if the 
employer were to prevail, which would be difficult at the summary 
judgment stage, the reputational and financial costs would be high for 
an employer whose actions were not, in fact, the result of a discrimi-
natory motive.133 
The majority then rejected Nassar’s penultimate argument, 
that of giving deference to EEOC guidelines, stating that the agency’s 
explanations of the Title VII provision lacked the persuasive force 
necessary to be given deference.134  Finally, the Court quickly dis-
pensed with Nassar’s argument that Price Waterhouse was control-
ling even if the section 2000e-2(m) standard did not apply, stating 
that the part of the Price Waterhouse framework which survived the 
1991 amendment would still be inconsistent with the statutory inter-
pretation of the word “because,” in light of Gross’s plain meaning in-
terpretation of a substantially similar statute.  In summation, the 
Court proclaimed that “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under 
section 2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2530. 
129 Id. at 2531-32. 
130 Id. 
131 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2532. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 2533 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.”135 
However, not everything went according to plan for UTSMC, 
as the Court denied grant of judgment as a matter of law and instead 
remanded Nassar back to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.136 
IV. A VIGOROUS DISSENT 
Justice Ginsburg authored a strong dissent, which was joined 
by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.137  The dissent admon-
ished the majority for seizing upon a provision that was “adopted by 
Congress as part of an endeavor to strengthen Title VII, and turn[ing] 
it into a measure reducing the force of the ban on retaliation.”138  
Turning the plain language reasoning of the majority on its head, Jus-
tice Ginsburg pointed out that both Title VII’s main provision, sec-
tion 2000e-2(a), and the subsection addressing retaliation, section 
2000e-3(a), contain identical language addressing causation: “be-
cause of.”139  Wrongful discrimination and retaliation for reporting it 
are so bound together, she wrote, as to be inextricable, as the Court 
has repeatedly held.140  Because retaliation in response to discrimina-
tion is discrimination, Justice Ginsburg concluded that there is no 
reason to apply a different standard of proof.141 
The dissent also accused the majority of misapprehending the 
lessons of past decisions and showing little regard for trial judges.142  
The Court agreed that a motivating factor standard must be used for 
establishing proof under section 2000e-2(a), so the majority was itself 
complicating the adjudication process by requiring a higher standard 
 
135 Id. at 2534. 
136 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534. 
137 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 2535. 
139 Id. at 2534.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.”). 
140 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535; see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 
179 n.3 (2005) (noting that discrimination and retaliation are intertwined). 
141 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2535. 
142 Id. 
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of proof for claims under section 2000e-3(a), which were often 
brought together by a single claimant.143  This disparity will cause ju-
rors to “puzzle over the rhyme or reason for the dual standards.”144 
After its own recitation of the facts in Nassar, the dissent ex-
plored the Congressional intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.145  
Looking to the House Reports written during the enactment of the 
1991 legislation, Justice Ginsburg presented direct evidence that 
Congress actually intended the amendments to provide additional 
protections and “‘respon[d] to a number of . . . decisions by [this 
Court] that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness’ of anti-
discrimination laws.”146  Thus, the 1991 abrogation of Price Water-
house was not meant to limit the scope of such discrimination claims, 
but to expand them and provide additional protections.147  As further 
proof, the dissent pointed out that section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), the af-
firmative defense provision added during the 1991 amendments, did 
not completely shield employers from liability, but merely limited 
plaintiff’s remedies to declaratory or injunctive relief, reasonable at-
torney’s fees, and costs.148 
Next, asserting that the Court’s conclusions defied logic,149 
the dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning, item by item.150  Jus-
tice Ginsburg pointed out that the Court’s categorization of retaliation 
as a distinct concept from status-based discrimination ran afoul of 
precedent.151  The dissent also called it “strange logic indeed to con-
clude that when Congress homed in on retaliation and codified the 
proscription, as it did in Title VII, Congress meant [that] protection . . 
. to have less force than the protection available when the statute does 
not mention retaliation.”152 
Characterizing the Court’s volte-face as “particularly impru-




145 Id. at 2538. 
146 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538; see H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. II, pp. 2-4 (1991), reprinted 
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 695-96. 
147 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2538-39. 
148 Id. at 2539. 
149 Id. at 2545. 
150 Id. at 2541-47. 
151 Id. at 2541; see Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174. 
152 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2541 (emphasis added). 
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tent to toughen antidiscrimination laws.153  With underwhelming ar-
guments, the majority had misinterpreted a clear message from Con-
gress, and this was the reason why it could not point to a single in-
stance in which an antidiscrimination law was found not to cover 
retaliation.154 
The dissent then questioned the majority’s dismissal of EEOC 
guidelines.155  By unfairly refusing to accord the EEOC any defer-
ence, the dissent claimed that the Court’s adoption of a heightened 
standard creates a system in which proven retaliation is permitted to 
go unpunished.156  This was a point the EEOC recognized.157 
In the next main focal point of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
attacked the Court’s reading of Gross and subsequent application in 
Nassar.158  While the Court in Gross took great pains to distinguish 
between ADEA claims and Title VII claims, the dissent charged the 
majority with now attempting to invoke a uniform interpretation.159  
According to the majority, the employer in Gross prevailed because 
the ADEA was not like Title VII, but the employer in Nassar should 
prevail because there is “no meaningful textual difference” between 
the ADA and Title VII.160  To Justice Ginsburg, this was the equiva-
lent to saying: “heads the employer wins, tails the employee loses.”161  
Instead, she urged that a standard principle of statutory interpretation 
should apply—that identical phrases appearing in the same statute 
should be construed to have the same meaning.162  Thus, Title VII’s 
retaliation provision should be governed by the same standard of cau-
sation as its status-based counterpart, which permits mixed motive 
claims.163 
The dissent then categorized the majority as insensitive to tri-
al judges.164  Given that causation is a complicated concept to explain 
to a jury under even the best of circumstances, a verdict requiring 
 
153 Id. at 2542. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 2543-44. 
156 Id. at 2544. 
157 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2544. 
158 Id. at 2544-45. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 2545. 
161 Id. 
162 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2545. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 2546. 
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multiple standards of causation was inappropriate, given that the gov-
erning statute did not require double standards, and was “virtually 
certain to sow confusion” upon practical application.165 
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the “substantial factor” theo-
ry of causation poked holes in the majority’s argument that but-for 
causation was “textbook tort law.”166  As previously made evident by 
the arguments presented and rejected in Price Waterhouse, “a strict 
but-for test is particularly ill-suited to employment discrimination 
cases,” considering that motive is based on subjective intent.167  The 
dissent argued that this was precisely the reason that Congress con-
sidered and rejected an amendment which would have placed the 
word “solely” before “because of race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin,” because elevating the standard would render the Act “to-
tally nugatory.”168 
Closing, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s decision as 
being at odds with the Court’s jurisprudential history.169  With “zeal 
to reduce the number of retaliation claims,” the majority overreached 
both precedent and congressional intent.170  In its effort to shield em-
ployers, the dissent admonished the majority for “reach[ing] outside 
of Title VII to arrive at an interpretation of ‘because’ that lacks sensi-
tivity to the realities of life at work.”171 
Yet, while Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for its 
unspoken motives, she did little to address the judicial resource con-
cerns behind the majority’s holding.  Other than pointing out that it 
seemed driven to reduce the number of retaliation claims, the dissent 
failed to address whether the majority’s concerns were at all legiti-
mate or relevant to the appropriate standard of causation.  In balanc-
ing those interests, perhaps the heightened causation policy might be 
considered sound after all.  Congress could choose to ratify the ma-
jority and codify the holding in Nassar, in which case committee re-




167 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547; see Gross, 557 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
168 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2547; see 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837-38 (1964) (commenting 
that a sole cause standard would render the Act “totally nugatory,” New Jersey Republican 
Senator Clifford Case partnered with Pennsylvania Democrat Joseph Clark to advocate the 
adoption of motivating factor language within Title VII). 
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chilling retaliation claims and lightening court dockets to be unspo-
ken directives from the case. 
As far as the left side of the Court is concerned, with the ma-
jority having issued the opinion, it is now up to the legislature to for-
mally express its intent by modifying the retaliation statute to be 
more specific.  Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, this “mis-
guided judgment . . . should prompt yet another Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act.”172  By formally declaring a lower uniform standard of cau-
sation, the legislature could decisively put this debate to rest once and 
for all.  Justifications for such a policy are not only logical, but also 
firmly rooted in American legislative history.  Historically underpriv-
ileged classes are entitled to suspect status classification.  To afford 
any real protection, policy-makers cannot merely prohibit employ-
ment discrimination based on an employee’s status.  Congress must 
also afford heightened protection for the courageous employee who 
actually reports being abused because of that immutable characteris-
tic.  It is pointless to afford heightened scrutiny to the treatment of a 
class, only to relax scrutiny for treatment in retaliation to complaints 
made in the class’s defense.  However, even if logic is on Justice 
Ginsburg’s side, with a stalled Congress and an employer-friendly 
socio-political environment, it will likely be some time before such 
an Act passes through Congress. 
In a per curiam opinion delivered on August 1, 2013, the Fifth 
Circuit vacated the district court’s decision in its entirety and re-
manded the case back to the trial court for proceedings consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s opinion.173  That case is still pending as of 
the time this case note was written. 
V. IMPLICATIONS ON STATE DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
The Nassar decision may also prove to be significant for its ef-
fect on analogous state discrimination and retaliation laws.  Although 
state discrimination laws operate independently of federal civil rights 
legislation, it is reasonable to assume that the Court’s interpretation 
will influence state judges and legislators alike.  While brevity pre-
cludes extensive analysis, a comparison between the federal approach 
and that adopted by New York may prove instructive to understanding 
the implications of the Nassar holding. 
 
172 Id. 
173 Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 537 F. App’x 525, 525 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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New York pioneered legislation to prohibit employment dis-
crimination in 1945, making it the first state in the nation to ban sta-
tus-based prejudice in the workplace.174  Although the Ives-Quinn 
Anti-Discrimination Law only recognized race, creed, color, and na-
tional origin as protected classes, it was re-named the New York 
State Human Rights Law and has been substantially expanded “to 
stay current with the changing American culture and with the needs 
of New Yorkers.”175  The current law protects additional classes, in-
cluding gender, sexual orientation, marital status, military status, and 
physical disability.176 
New York has also expanded protection outside of the sphere 
of employment to regulate housing, finance and banking, accommoda-
tions, and non-sectarian educational institutions.177  However, although 
New York has taken a more expansive view toward protected classes, 
when it comes to retaliation claims the New York State Court of Ap-
peals has looked to the federal courts for guidance.  On several occa-
sions, the court has noted that “ ‘[b]ecause both the [New York] Hu-
man Rights Law and Title VII address the same type of discrimination, 
afford victims similar forms of redress, are textually similar and ulti-
mately employ the same standards of recovery, federal case law . . . 
proves helpful to the resolution of [New York state claims].’ ”178  
Knowing the persuasive force of federal case law, New York civil 
rights lawyers can do little more than wait and see if the heightened 
federal retaliation standard will impact their causation burden in future 
state discrimination claims. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is ironic that a federal law designed to prevent discrimina-
tion has been itself interpreted to discriminate among and between 
protected classes and activities.  Although valid Title VII claims gen-
erally should still survive prima facie scrutiny, the heightened causa-
 
174 Agency History, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.dhr.ny.go 
v/agency-history (last visited May 2, 2014). 
175 Id. 
176 Mission Statement, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.dhr.ny. 
gov/mission-statement (last visited May 2, 2014). 
177 Id. 
178 Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1006 n.3 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting 
Matter of Aurecchione v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 771 N.E.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. 
2002)). 
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tion standard will unquestionably reduce the number of retaliation 
cases that ultimately make it to trial.  Thus, the majority accom-
plished what the dissent claimed to be its target objective.  But, it 
may have come at the expense of aggrieved employees, who will be 
unable to satisfy the higher standard of causation with only limited 
circumstantial proofs.  Unless the legislature intervenes and formally 
establishes a lower standard, it is likely that the Court’s majority will 
gradually begin to insist on applying but-for causation to all employ-
ment discrimination claims.  If that trend continues, the once ubiqui-
tous Title VII claim will become just another relic of a bygone era in 
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